Introduction
Profitability depends on how efficiently scarce resources are utilized. The relevant measure of efficiency depends on the economic objective. In a private company, the objective is to maximize its contribution to the income and wealth of the owners in the short or long term. The economic profit in each period is given by the maximum distribution to the owners, without reducing the firm's market value. The value concept is forward-looking, in the sense that the market value of the company is the present value of the future cash flow that it is expected to generate for the owners. A positive present value means that the enterprise is yielding an average rate of the return on invested capital that is at least as large as the owners could have achieved by reinvesting the financial capital in the external financial market, assuming this to be the alternative investment opportunity. Hence, profitability is defined in relation to the external rate of return opportunity for the capital required to operate the company.
The rate of return in the alternative investment opportunity will therefore be a benchmark which the profitability of the company is measured against. Usually, the rate of return in the financial market is used as a hurdle rate for the internal profitability, and may be modified in order to take into account the risk the owners have to bear. The alternative rate of return opportunity is an opportunity cost for investing capital in the company.
The concept of opportunity cost is central for the analysis of economic profitability. This is the case not only for capital, but also for all resources required for running an enterprise, or for undertaking a particular project. Scarcity values are often called shadow prices and are related to opportunity costs in the sense that allocating a resource to a specific purpose entails an economic sacrifice as given by the opportunity cost. Hence, the opportunity cost is an implicit price that the value generated by the resource in a given enterprise has to match. For a private company, the economic sacrifice is what the firm has to pay for labour and other necessary factors of production.
When the difference between a company's sales revenue and opportunity costs is positive, it is run at an economic profit. The opportunity costs are not necessarily what the company has actually paid for its factor inputs, but the values they might have generated in an external opportunity. This means that even if the difference between its revenues and payable costs is positive, it may not be profitable in the economic sense of being the most profitable way the owners could have used their scarce resources. It depends on the relevant opportunity cost. If relocating the company to another country leads to a higher capital return, the return on this external opportunity will be the relevant benchmark for its profitability. The company's book profit is based on actual costs, which can be different from opportunity costs. Hence, a firm may be unprofitable in an economic sense, even though it is run at a positive book profit.
In principle, the same sort of reasoning applies to the concept of profitability to society. The perspective may, however, be different, as there are more stakeholders with an interest in the social surplus. Society's stakeholders are those affected by the enterprise's operations in different roles and various arenas. In addition to the owners, the main stakeholders are consumers, workers and taxpayers. Hence, society's stakes in the company are broader than that of its owners. This difference in perspective has implications for how profitability to society relates to company profitability . Customers are important for the firm's profitability, as they contribute to its revenue. From society's perspective, customers contribute to the social profitability of the company through the social value derived from the consumption of goods it has produced. This implies that for domestic companies producing only for export, the business and social valuation of the firm's revenue coincide, since the export revenue accrues to the country's citizens, whereas the consumption takes place abroad.
The absence of a market price reflecting the monetary value of users' valuation makes it difficult to assess the social value on the consumption side. The value assessment must therefore rely on other means. A common practice is to ask potential users about their willingness to pay for the service. This may be relevant for assessing the gains from, say, projects aimed at improving the environment, or for assessing the environmental cost for those affected negatively by environmental degradation as a side effect.
There are also different reasons why market prices in cases where well-functioning markets exist do not necessarily provide good guidelines for assessing social profitability. The challenge is to examine how market prices should be corrected in order to reflect true willingness to pay, or true social opportunity costs.
There are three main reasons why market prices do not correspond to socially optimal prices. These are external effects, natural monopoly and fiscally motivated taxes and levies.
External effects. External effects are economic consequences that the decisions of individual agents impose on other agents which (i) are not taken into account in the economic calculations governing the agent's decisions, and (ii) do not go through markets. Point (i) implies that the individual market agent does not take into account the total costs or gains that can be attributed to his decisions. In such cases private or commercial profitability does not reflect the true contribution to social profitability. In the presence of external effects, economic decisions based on market prices and commercial profits will not lead to socially optimal uses of resources. Point (ii) views external effects as a deficiency within the market system, since market prices do not capture all the welfare-related aspects of consumption and use of scarce resources in the economy. This may be due to the fact that there are scarce resources that are not traded through markets and consequently have no market prices. In this respect, the problem of assessing social profitability for projects having external effects is closely related to that caused by the lack of markets.
External effects can be negative or positive, and they can arise in transactions between consumers, producers, or between producers and consumers. Positive external effects imply that decisions taken by an agent have positive effects for other agents, with the originating agent remaining uncompensated for such positive side effects through the market reward system. As such effects are not reflected in market-based revenues and profits, they will not be taken into account by commercially motivated market agents. Thus, actions inducing positive external effects will be carried out on a smaller scale compared with what is socially optimal. Conversely, negative external effects are detrimental effects on utility or productivity imposed on other agents, without those causing such external costs being held economically responsible in the market place. From society's point of view such actions are undertaken on too large a scale.
Negative external effects are where market prices exaggerate society's net willingness to pay if the consumption of an individual imposes negative effects on others, or where a company's costs undervalue total costs to society, because outputs or inputs have negative effects on other agents. Correspondingly, positive external effects are where market prices undervalue social benefits and a company's costs overvalue the true social costs. Examples of external effects are prolific. An important class of negative external effects is pollution. When a firm emits a pollutant into a river which causes negative effects on downstream users, these effects are costs to society which do not show up in the company's book accounts. These costs may be due to qualitative degradation of the river's value as a recreational resource, or to the fact that other companies, dependent on clean water from the river as an input, will be subjected to increased costs. The polluting firm will therefore undervalue the total costs in determining its optimal production level.
Natural monopoly. Natural monopoly is a term used to characterize activities where there are economies of scale in production, to the extent that average production costs decrease with increased production. The defining property implies that a single production unit will produce goods at lower average costs, compared to the situation where the production is split up and produced by two or more production units. For single items, this will be the case if variable production costs are small compared to fixed costs related to establishing and maintaining the production capacity. A larger scale production means that there are more units of the product on which to distribute the fixed costs, so that the total cost per unit will decrease.
Enterprises that require large investment in infrastructure are often natural monopolies. In particular, this is usually the case for firms that are based on a physical network, e.g. airports, railways, electricity networks, water supply and sewage. The problem with natural monopolies is that, in the absence of price regulation, the monopoly power can be used to set the price above marginal and average cost, in order to capture a larger part of the consumer surplus. As this will be a pure redistribution from the buyers of the monopoly's services to the owners of the monopoly, this monopoly profit will not contribute to the value added in society. On the contrary, by raising the price above the marginal production cost, the sum of the consumer surplus and producer profit is reduced. The monopoly will therefore set a higher price and produce a lower volume than where the social value is maximized, by marginal cost pricing. Price equal to marginal cost will, however, entail a commercial deficit, as marginal cost is less than average cost. If the monopoly is required to recoup its total costs in the market, optimally regulated prices will maximize total consumer surplus, subject to the constraint that its total costs are covered.
If the natural monopoly exerts its power in supplying inputs to other domestic companies, the price of the inputs will be higher than the marginal social sacrifice shown in the marginal cost. This leads to repercussions, in the form of production volumes that are too small, and social efficiency losses in enterprises that are dependent on inputs from domestic natural monopolies. In such cases the problem arises as to what price should be used in assessing the social profitability of projects that depend on inputs from domestic natural monopolies being incompletely regulated. There are two issues here. One is the market monopoly price. The other is the social sacrifice, as given by the actual marginal cost in production. If the monopoly were optimally regulated, it would be natural to use the regulated market price, so that private and public companies dependent on the monopolised supply of the actual input could use the same price for the input in their profitability assessment. In this case the monopoly supply would be allocated efficiently among public and private firms, if the latter have no market power.
Taxes and levies. Because of taxes and levies, the price the producer receives for selling a good or a service is less than the price paid by the buyer. This difference constitutes the tax or levy imposed on the good. Conversely, for goods and services that are subsidised, the price which the producer receives is higher than the price the buyer pays. Assuming the good is subject to a unit tax equal to t levied on the producer, and that the tax exclusive price is p, the buyer will pay p + t, while the seller receives p. Assuming the market is perfectly competitive so that the producer keeps producing until the tax exclusive price is equal to marginal cost, while the consumers buy until the marginal willingness to pay is equal to the tax inclusive price, the marginal willingness to pay in consumption will be higher than the marginal production cost in the market equilibrium. Due to the tax. the profit maximizing volume will be less than that maximizing the total social surplus, which results in an efficiency loss. The efficiency loss is due to the fact that the private producer considers the unit tax as a cost, whereas, from a social point of view, it is a transfer from the firm to the government. The commercial profitability of increased production is therefore less than what it is to society, so that the production volume will be too small from a social point of view.
In this case, the question will also arise as to what price should be used in a social profitability analysis: the tax inclusive or exclusive price. As an example, this problem may be considered in connection with calculating the cost to society for using domestic labour. If the wage per time unit is w and the wage tax is t, the worker will receive w(1-t). If, for the sake of the argument, it is assumed that the labour supply is perfectly competitive, workers will supply labour until the marginal sacrifice in terms of reduced leisure (measured in monetary terms) is equal to the after tax wage. The company, on the other hand, will demand labour until the value of the marginal product of labour equals the wage before tax. Here the question also arises of what wage should be established when examining the social profitability of the project. The same type of problem arises regarding the treatment of payroll taxes levied on the employer.
Since taxes and levies cause a wedge between marginal willingness to pay on the demand side, and marginal costs on the supply side, financing projects by taxes will entail a social financing cost, due to the resulting efficiency loss. In Norway the official estimate of average social tax cost is 20% per krone of taxes 1 . This is called the social cost of public funds, as it will be the social cost of financing a project by tax revenue. This means that when financed by taxes, the tax cost of a public project amounts to 20% of the net revenue effect on the overall public budget. The sequel discusses how to make the valuation principles operative and how they are to be implemented in practice. Also discussed are valuation questions relating to large projects, how to treat incomplete information and uncertainty about the relation between inputs and outputs, and the desirability of retaining flexibility in carrying out projects.
The alternative to tax financing is financing the project in the market through user charges if that is possible, or by a profit margin on the services from the project. This, too, entails an efficiency loss, as the price faced by the users is higher than the actual marginal cost on the supply side. From an efficiency point of view splitting the financing between financing in the market and financing by taxes may in many cases minimize the total financing costs. The criterion for the optimum financing mix would, then, be that the marginal efficiency loss per krone is equal for both modes of finance.
Outlining the project's boundaries and identifying alternatives
Profitability analysis is a tool for supporting decisions as to uses of scarce resources, and is relevant only to the extent that the required resources have alternative uses. If there are no alternatives to using the resources in the project, there is no problem of choice, as there are no degrees of freedom as to the uses of inputs. The alternative use of resources may be in an alternative project, which will then be a benchmark, or it may be the initial use of the resources -often referred to as the base alternative. The project under scrutiny and the base alternative are mutually exclusive projects competing for scarce resources. Most projects have a time dimension both as to output and costs. The project is then defined in terms of the time path for its services, resource requirements and resource costs over its lifetime. In such cases the base alternative is simply the time path of the initial situation without the project. This is often referred to as the reference path, with which the time path of the project in question is to be compared.
Some projects have a local feature, in the sense that they affect resource uses and outputs in a given market or within a given sector. A typical example is the building of a local road. The service rendered by the project is the gain in time for local traffic, and the costs are dictated by the construction cost. This describes the total consequences of the project. Other projects are large, with nationwide repercussions across several sectors. In such cases it can be difficult to distinguish between new activities that are generated by the project, and relocation of existing activities in space and time. New activities induced by the project should be treated as an integral part of the project, whereas spatially relocated activities affect primarily the regional income distribution. However, if such induced activities produce goods or employ resources that are not allocated through the market, or where market prices are distorted, the value of such externalities must be added to the benefit or cost side of the project, depending on whether it is an external gain or cost. For example, if building a railway between two cities leads to a relocation of ancillary activities to an area with structural unemployment problems, the increased activities reduce the efficiency loss in the local labour market, which is a positive effect that should be added to the project's benefit side.
The relation between market prices and marginal willingness to pay and social opportunity costs
The value of goods produced for domestic private consumption is dictated by the consumers' willingness to pay for such goods. For a given consumer, the marginal willingness to pay will normally fall with increased quantity of consumption, so that the average willingness to pay is higher than the marginal willingness. The theory of consumer behaviour assumes that the consumer demands quantities of a given good until the marginal willingness to pay for that good is equal to the market price. In equilibrium the market price will reflect the consumer's marginal willingness to pay. If the project has a negligible effect on the market price, the correct price to be used in a social profit assessment is the price faced by consumers in the market. This implies that for goods that are subject to fiscally motivated levies or taxes, the price should include taxes and levies, since the tax revenue is the share of consumers' willingness to pay what is collected by the government. On the contrary, if the excise taxes are motivated by negative external effects in consumption, the price should be the market price net of such levies, as they represent the external social cost of consuming such goods and should therefore be deducted from the individual willingness to pay. An example of such a tax is that on gasoline. For goods that are being exported, the correct price should be the net export price, assuming that the world market price is not affected by the project. This means that it should be net of export taxes or subsidies, as these are neither national income nor national costs.
Generally, the value of collective goods is dictated by the sum of individual willingness to pay by all potential users. When the consumption cannot be individualised and consumers are not excludable, there will not be any markets for such goods, and hence no market prices that can convey information about individual willingness to pay. Willingness to pay and social values will then have to be assessed without any support from market prices. Value assessments should distinguish between direct and indirect methods. Direct methods are based on interviews with potential users about their willingness to pay for the supply of a specified set of collective goods. This value assessment is hypothetical, in the sense that the respondent is asked to express his/her willingness to pay for particular collective goods if they were to be supplied. This hypothetical nature of the valuation of the goods is the main weakness with the direct method, since the expressed value is not part of the actual budget constraint, so that the respondent is not faced with a market trade-off between the public goods in question and private market goods.
Indirect methods utilise the fact that in many cases there are market goods that are perfect complements to collective goods. The market valuation of such perfect complements may then capture the valuation of the collective goods. Such market complements can be private goods or activities that are required in order to get access to collective goods. This might be the case for many locally collective goods, e.g. where access to a good housing environment can only be obtained by buying a house in the actual area. The valuation of the collective amenity will then be capitalised in the market value of houses located in this area.
Market prices of inputs and social costs
Here it may be useful to use the analogy with a company's assessment of the cost for inputs that are partly bought in the market, and partly procured by deliveries within the company. For a country, the international market will be the analogy to the external market. For imports, the economic sacrifice for the country will be the import price net of duties and other levies. Levies on imports are a pure transfer from the importing firm to the government, and the country at large will neither benefit nor lose from such transfers.
If the importing company is a government agency supplying a monopoly service, the above reasoning would undoubtedly hold true. However, if it is a private enterprise, the import duty would be an expense for the company, and, would be regarded as part of the costs for the imported input. If the private company was competing with the public agency, the import duty would give the public agency a competitive advantage, due to the treatment of the import duty, and not due to the public agency being more cost efficient than the private firm. The possibility that private companies might be crowded out by less efficient public enterprises, due to different treatment of import duties in their profitability calculations, would result in a social cost, and should be taken into consideration when laying down rules for the treatment of import duties in public enterprises. A practical and simple way of doing this would be through a two-step procedure. First one should decide whether competing private alternatives to the public project exist. If the answer is affirmative, the public enterprise should use the import price including the import levy. If not, the import price net of the levy should be used.
A similar reasoning applies to the assessment of the social cost of using resources that could alternatively have been exported. The most important case for Norway in this respect is the social cost of using natural gas as input in the domestic production of electrical power. If this does not affect the price of Norwegian natural gas in the international market, the export price represents the economic sacrifice for the country. If using natural gas domestically for electric power generation causes negative external effects for Norwegian citizens, the monetary value of this externality should be included as part of the input costs. As to natural gas in particular, most of the pollution is due to emission of CO 2 . In this case, the consequences will be global, so that they will only be borne by Norwegian citizens to a limited extent. If the only consideration is the welfare effects for Norwegian citizens, these global effects should not be included in the cost benefit analysis. However, Norway has taken upon itself to observe a maximum limit for her CO 2 emissions. To the extent that this limit is binding, the national emission costs for a power plant fuelled by natural gas will be the negative effects on the value added, as other production activities have to reduce their CO 2 emissions. This will then be the national emission cost. If there were a well functioning domestic market for emission quotas, this negative external effect would be reflected in the quota price. This is yet another example of the fact that social profitability analyses are simpler in economies with welldeveloped markets.
The remaining problem lies in assessing the social cost of factor inputs from the sheltered sector, i.e. situations where the import opportunity is not available or feasible. In the present situation, this is the case for certain segments of the labour market. However, due to income taxation, the social cost of labour depends on whether it is seen from the supply or the demand side in the labour market. The economic sacrifice of using labour is its social opportunity cost. If the labour market is healthy and import of labour is ruled out, increased input of labour has to be covered either by increased supply, by reduced input of labour in other domestic activities, or by a combination of the two. In the first case the sacrifice is in terms of reduced leisure, and, in the latter case, in terms of reduced value added in the alternative employment. However, the presence of a wage tax drives a wedge between the marginal opportunity value of labour in the two alternative uses of the workers' time endowment. In a competitive labour market, workers will offer labour until the marginal value of leisure foregone is equal to the after-tax wage. Letting w note the pre-tax wage and assuming a wage tax of 50%, the after-tax wage is 0.5w. This is then the marginal monetary shadow price of leisure. Employers will demand labour until the gross wage including the payroll tax is equal to the marginal value product of labour. Setting the payroll tax at 0.15, the marginal value of labour on the production side will be equal to 1.15w in equilibrium. Thus, if the opportunity cost on the production side is the relevant social cost of labour, projects that have a positive effect on labour supply will be more profitable from a social point of view, compared with projects that draw labour away from existing production activities.
However, if taxes were set optimally initially and there is no involuntary unemployment, it would not be reasonable to consider increased employment as a gain in the social profitability of a project. If this were the case, the tax system could not be optimally designed in the first place, and it would be more efficient to attain this positive effect on employment by a tax change. According to this reasoning, one should assess the social cost of using labour in a public project as if the project was threatening available labour in private employment. This means that one should use the gross wage including the payroll tax as the social cost. Competitive neutrality is thus achieved between private and public use of labour.
The required rate of return and the public discount rate.
Many public projects are capital intensive. This is the case within communications, energy supply, water and sewerage systems. The cost of using capital will therefore be an important factor for the profitability of such projects. In principle, the cost of binding capital in a project should reflect its opportunity cost, which in this case is the social rate of return on capital in the best alternative investment opportunity. In a closed economy with the domestic capital market in equilibrium, capital for a specific investment can be obtained in two ways: either by increased domestic saving, or by reduced capital investment in alternative production activities, or even by a combination of the two. The cost of providing capital by increased saving is compensation in the form of the capital returns savers will require in order to be willing to defer consumption. If consumer savings are privately optimal, the required compensation is given by the real after-tax interest rate. Alternatively, capital can be provided by private companies reducing their investments. The social cost of this is the reduced value added from the private use of capital. If the taxation of companies is neutral with respect to their investments, the opportunity cost is given by the real rate of return before tax. However, given that the capital market is initially in equilibrium, the provision of capital, either by means of increased savings or reduced private investments, presupposes that the project must lead to a higher real interest rate. If the project is sufficiently large and capital is scarce, this may not be entirely unrealistic. However, today, with access to an international capital market with full capital mobility, the domestic interest rate level is tied to the interest rate level in the international capital market. In such a scenario it is quite improbable that even large domestic projects will have any interest rate effect on the domestic use of capital. Hence, in an open economy the interest rate in the international capital market will be the relevant opportunity cost for domestic use of capital. This will also be the case for public projects.
Accounting for risk in the benefit-cost analysis.
Capital intensive projects have often a long duration. This means that their profitability may depend on distant future factors about which there is considerable uncertainty at the time when the decision on the realisation of the project has to be taken. The uncertainty may partly be due to factors and events that are beyond the control of the decision-maker. It might be future rainfall for a water power plant, the development of air traffic in the case of a new airport, etc. The uncertainty may also be due to factors that can be influenced by the decisionmaker to some extent, either by the project's design, or by its realisation, or by collecting information about important factors for its profitability that are uncertain at the time of the decision.
It is commonly assumed that when it comes to important economic decisions, most people have risk aversion. One implication of risk aversion is that, with the mathematical expectation of an uncertain result as reference point, the decision-maker assigns a larger weight on negative deviations than on comparable positive ones. If the result is measured in monetary terms, this means that the safety equivalent result is lower than the expected value, and the difference reflects the compensation one requires in order to be willing to bear the economic risk associated with the decision. Thus, risk-bearing involves a cost, and this should somehow be included in the cost-benefit analysis of the project. For risks beyond the control of the decision-maker the question is how this cost should be assessed in quantitative terms and how it should be accounted for in the analysis. For risks that can be influenced by collecting relevant information prior to the start up of the project, or by choosing more flexible project concepts, the problem is to assess the cost and gains from collecting additional information, or from choosing more flexible concepts that are more adjustable to new information. The first type of risk is exogenous, in the sense that the decision-maker has to take it as given, whereas the second type depends to some degree on how the project is designed and carried out.
Exogenous risk and project profitability
It is a basic insight from the portfolio approach to investment under uncertainty that the risk of the project cannot be regarded in isolation,: rather it should be seen in the light of its contribution to the total economic risk that the decision-maker bears. This is given by the risk associated with the returns on the total investment portfolio. In other words, the risk of a given project depends on what portfolio it is a part of, and what the decision-maker can do in order to hedge against such risk. An important distinction in this respect is that of unsystematic and systematic risk.
Unsystematic risk is sometimes referred to as specific risk. This kind of risk affects a very small number of projects in the portfolio. An example is an event that affects a specific project, such as a strike by the employees working on the project. Systematic risk, on the other hand, influences a large number of projects. A significant political event or an unexpected general rise in the wage level is an example of systematic risk.
The impact of unsystematic risk is reduced when the project is included in a larger portfolio, where negative and positive variations in the returns of the underlying assets tend to cancel each other out. The scope for reducing the risk on the total portfolio by investing in several projects depends, therefore, on how the returns on the individual projects are correlated. Where the returns of a specific project are perfectly negatively correlated with the returns on the total portfolio net of the project, investing in the project can eliminate the risk of the portfolio, and will act as a perfect hedge. If the returns are negatively but not perfectly correlated, the portfolio risk will be reduced, but not eliminated. Only where the returns are uncorrelated with those on the portfolio, is a project's contribution to the portfolio risk given by its "stand alone" risk. Projects with returns that are positively correlated with the portfolio returns will have an effective contribution to the portfolio risk, which is larger than the projects' own risk. Systematic risk characterizes projects for which the profitability depends on one or more uncertain common factors. Examples are wage levels, import prices and the international interest rate, etc. Due to such common uncertain cost factors the projects' returns will be positively correlated. Systematic risk cannot be reduced by diversification, i.e. spreading the investment over several projects. If there are efficient markets for diversifying unsystematic risk, the profitability assessment only has to take into account a project's contribution to systematic risk.
For the public sector investing in many different projects, the risk of the public investment portfolio will be given by its systematic risk. If the government evaluates its investments according to their social returns, the relevant risk for a project will be given by its effect on the variability of the total national value added. This in turn will be given by the national income for the social surplus that is created in markets. Thus, from a national perspective, it is likely that most unsystematic risk will be washed away in the national portfolio of investment projects.
The market price of risk and the required social rate of return.
In principle, it makes no difference whether one discounts expected project surpluses with a risk-adjusted discount rate, or discounts certainty equivalent surpluses with the riskless rate of interest, as the former can be deduced from the latter. Generally, it is preferable to relate social shadow prices to market prices, so that objective price information in the market can be used in the social profitability analysis, if such prices exist. In the stock market the risk is implicitly priced in the form of a required risk-adjusted rate of return. When market information about the cost of bearing risk is given by risk-adjusted rates of return, a project's risk is more readily accounted for in the cost-benefit analysis by using a risk-adjusted discount rate, rather than a risk-adjusted assessment of the project's surpluses.
The risk of an investment in a given portfolio can be quantified by the co-variance between the investment's rate of return and that of the portfolio. Using the statistical variance of the portfolio returns as a risk measure, the ratio between this co-variance and the variance of the total portfolio rate of return will express the project risk as a share of the portfolio risk. This is called the investment's beta (β). If beta equals zero, this means that the investment's contribution to the portfolio risk is zero. In this case, the investment is, in fact, riskless, as the portfolio risk remains unchanged. The case β=1 means that the investment has exactly the same risk profile as the total portfolio. Interpreting each investment as an equity share, and the total portfolio as all shares traded in the stock market -the so-called market portfolio -the beta value of a given share will show how the share's risky return co-varies with the return of the market portfolio. Denoting the risk-free rate of return in the market by r and the expected return on the market portfolio by E(R), then E(R)-r is the expected excess return required by the market investors in order to be willing to hold the market portfolio. Multiplying this expected excess return by the share's beta value, shows the excess return required by the market in order to hold the share in question. Denoting the market's required risk-adjusted return on this share by k, we get the investment criterion in terms of a risk-adjusted hurdle rate 3 :
k=r+β[E(R) -r]
It should be noted that for β=0 the required rate of return will be equal to the riskless interest rate, while for β=1 it will be equal to E(R), which is the required expected rate of return on the market portfolio.
This approach can be also be used for assessing the risk-adjusted required social rate of return on investment projects generally. The analogy with the market portfolio will now be the total investment portfolio in the country, the rate of return on which is given by the national income. With the basic assumption that the risk profile of the stock market portfolio is representative of the risk profile of the country's total investment portfolio, the stock market pricing of risk can be used as a basis for the social pricing of risk. The social hurdle rate of return can then be determined by finding the beta-value that represents the actual investment's risk profile.
An essential assumption for basing the social cost of risk-bearing on the pricing of risk in the stock market, is that the risk profile of the rate of return on the market portfolio is approximately representative of the risk profile of the national income, reflecting the total returns on the national investment portfolio. Moreover, the risk aversion of those trading in listed assets must be representative of the risk aversion of those bearing the social risk associated with real investments. In practice, relying on stock market data implies that, for a given investment, one must find a listed risk copy in the stock market -i.e. one with the same risk profile -and then use the beta-value of this risk copy. This procedure presupposes that the hurdle rate of return of the market portfolio also reflects the social hurdle rate of return for investments with the same risk profile as that of the market portfolio.
However, there is an important difference between the rate of return in the stock market and the rate of return that is relevant for society. The stock market value and the derived market price of risk relate to the returns that accrue to the shareholders of the underlying companies. The social returns, however, also include the share of the returns that accrues to those who have provided loans to the company, and, in addition the share that accrues to the government as corporate taxes. In order to make the social returns on an investment comparable in terms of risk with the rate of returns priced in the stock market, one should use the risk of the total returns before corporate taxes in listed companies. The task will then be to find a listed company with a risk profile for its total returns being representative of the risk profile of the investment in question, which may be assumed to be a public investment. The market's hurdle rate for the total returns before taxes for this company will be a market-based hurdle rate for this public investment. As the share holders bear most of the economic risk in corporations, it seems plausible that the beta-value for the total returns of the company must be lower than that for the equity returns. Assuming that the company's debt is completely risk-free (absence of default risk), the beta-value of the returns on total capital will be αβ E' where α is the share of equity capital, and β E is the beta-value for the returns to equity. However, it must also be noted that the excess return E(R) -r, which the market requires in order to hold the market portfolio, is derived from stock market data, and hence it is net of the corporate income tax and the personal taxes on the returns to shareholders.
The required excess return is usually referred to as the market's risk premium, and MP t denotes this risk premium after personal and corporate income tax. Assuming that the corporate income tax rate is equal to the personal capital income tax rate
, where the superscript denotes after-tax value and t is this common tax rate. The hurdle rate of return to equity after tax , , will then be
Disregarding that lenders 5 may also bear some of the business risk, the pre-tax risk-adjusted hurdle rate of return on total capital will then be given by
Assuming a risk-free real rate of interest of 2.5%, an average share of equity in listed companies equal to 0.4, a risk premium after taxes in the stock market of 4.5%, and a tax rate of 28%, there is a risk-adjusted real hurdle rate of return on total capital of 5%. This hurdle rate applies to public investments, and to investments undertaken by non-listed firms having a risk profile of the total returns corresponding to that of a representative listed company.
Project evaluation at an early stage
At an early stage in the planning and profitability assessment of a project, one will typically face a demand for a given type of service, e.g. a transportation service, and the aim is to find a project concept that satisfies this specific need in the most efficient way. This preliminary analysis may take the form of a cost-efficiency analysis, to find the project concept that satisfies the given need at the lowest cost. Such a cost-efficiency analysis may however be complicated by the fact that future factors on the utility and cost side of the project may vary in an unpredictable way from that anticipated in the preliminary analysis.
The role of the discount rate for the profitability analysis at the preliminary stage. It should be emphasised that the problem of assessing a project's profitability at an early stage is mainly due to the lack of information about the factors that are most essential for its profitability. This requires collection of further information and choice of a project concept that is sufficiently flexible to draw advantage from additional information. Compensating for this lack of information by adjusting the discount rate for the resulting risk seems to be somewhat off the mark. On the other hand, the hurdle rate of return as given by the discount rate is a benchmark that has to be matched by the rate of return of a profitable project.
A given hurdle rate of return has the effect that potential projects are sorted into two classes: One class of projects that are profitable, and another class of projects that do not generate the required rate of return. Having rather scarce information about the profitability of the projects in question may lead to a considerable risk in terms of sorting errors. There are two types of erroneous sorting. One accepts the project -or the project concept -when it should have been rejected. In analogy with statistical inference theory, this may be called a Type II error. The other type relates to projects that are rejected when they should have been accepted -a Type I error. Given that information is initially incomplete, both types of errors will occur. If the criterion for acceptance is that the expected present value of a profitable project must be nonnegative, the relative frequency of the two types of error will depend on the discount rate reflecting the required rate of return. With a higher discount rate, fewer projects will pass the profitability hurdle and there will be fewer Type II errors, while there will be more Type I errors. Conversely, a lower discount rate will lead to more projects being classified as profitable, and there will be relatively more Type II errors, and fewer of Type I. In this perspective, the size of the hurdle rate of return as the criterion for sorting will depend on what type of error is considered to be most serious. With specifically irreversible projects, it may be important to avoid Type II errors, i.e. to avoid accepting projects that are shown to be unprofitable, given more accurate information. This is an argument for a high hurdle rate in the preliminary screening between profitable and unprofitable project concepts. 6 Generally, the less information available regarding its true profitability, the more risky the project will be. The risk term in the risk-adjusted discount rate depends on the project's systematic risk. At the early stage, the systematic risk can be influenced by the choice of the project design. Hence, all being equal, it will be important to find project concepts where profitability is less dependent on the general state of the economy (the business cycle). It may be argued that Norwegian citizens are overly exposed to oil-related risk. Hence, from the perspective of social risk, it may be sensible to choose project concepts for which the social profitability is less dependent on the price of oil. In this way the risk and the risk-adjusted hurdle rate will depend on the project design, and is, to some degree, endogenously determined.
Endogenous risk: Collecting information and the scope for utilizing new information in designing and timing of the project.
Most investment projects are irreversible. In particular, this is the case with transport projects such as roads, tunnels and airports. This implies that the larger part of the investment cost can be recovered once the investment is undertaken. Secondly, important drivers for the profitability of the project may be uncertain at the time of investment. If part of the uncertainty is of the milestone type, it will be revealed with the passing of time. Thirdly, there is often a choice as to timing and to the way the project is carried out. It might, for example, be sensible to wait for the milestone risk to be resolved before taking irreversible decisions. Optimal timing will depend on the cost of waiting relative to the value of keeping the investment decision open (keeping the option open). The wait-and-see decision requires a method for calculating what the investment option is worth, i.e. the value of keeping open the option of not undertaking the project. It may also be possible to carry out the project in a stepwise manner, assuming additional information will be accrued during the project period.
Investing in a new airport may serve as an example where the most important risk factor is uncertainty about the future development of air traffic. In this case a stepwise realisation of the project may be sensible. This can take place by first building one runway, and allowing the question of two runways to depend on the development of the traffic. A stepwise realisation will normally be more costly compared to realising the project in full scale from the outset. However, this additional cost should be considered as a sort of insurance premium against the unfavourable outcome of having permanently excess capacity in the case of an unfavourable development of air traffic. The profitability of a flexible solution with a stepwise construction schedule will depend on how much additional information will be gained from waiting. The degree of the investor's risk aversion is also important here.
Collecting information prior to the decision.
Expected values of future project surpluses are based on available information at the time of the decision. Usually, it is an implicit assumption that the information collected prior to the decision has been optimised. If not, the project risk can be reduced by collecting additional information before the decision is taken. Generally, it will be profitable to collect project relevant information, as long as the expected value of additional information is greater than the additional cost. The value of new information is that it is likely to change the initially optimal decision in a positive way. Making this operational requires that it is possible to revise the probabilities for the relevant outcomes in the light of new information. However, it is important to note that for the additional information to have any positive value, the probability must be greater than zero that it can lead to a changed decision. If the optimal decision relative to the existing information about critical factors will not be affected by new information, the additional information has no economic value.
Assuming that the project in question is to build a tunnel through a hill from A to B, and the cost depends on how suitable the rock is for the building of tunnels. If the choice is between such a tunnel and an alternative connection without a tunnel, information about the nature of the rock might be important for the choice. In such a situation it might be profitable to spend resources on test drillings in order to reveal the actual conditions for building a tunnel. On the contrary, if there is no suitable alternative to the tunnel, and it has to be built anyway, this information is of no importance for the decision, even though it might be important for planning the project.
Consequently, additional information will have the greatest value in the planning phase of a project where the possibilities for adapting to the new information are highest. Once the project is being carried out and various irreversible decisions are taken, the possibilities for project changes are consequently reduced, and hence new information will be of less value. An irreversible project that, at the time of decision-making would have been deemed unprofitable in the light of ex-post information, might therefore be profitable to operate once it has been completed as the investment costs are not recoverable in any case.
The theory of real options as an approach to investment under uncertainty
A feasible option is to postpone the decision on accepting the project, pending additional information. If the project is profitable relative to initial information, postponement means that reaping the expected value created by the project is simply deferred. This creates a waiting cost if the decision-maker has a positive time preference. The reason for deferring the decision on carrying out the project must be to obtain additional information about the profitability of the project in time, or that it will become less costly to collect such information at a later point. This would be particularly the case for milestone risk that is resolved at a given point in the future. However, it would not be a valid reason for postponing the project if it were possible to get back to the initial situation without incurring any costs, i.e. to the situation prior to the decision to undertake the project, if the information collected at a later stage revealed that an unprofitable project had been chosen. On the other hand, if the project is irreversible, e.g. because it necessitates investment of the sunk cost type, that cannot be recovered even if the project is closed down, carrying out the project immediately would entail a cost in the form of lost decision flexibility in a future situation with new information. Thus, postponing the decision to carry out the project gives an option value, of maintaining the option of rejecting the project if the updated information shows it to be unprofitable. This can happen if an unfavourable outcome of the random factor underlying the milestone risk is realised. If the option value is positive, a positive risk-adjusted expected present value of the project would not be a sufficient condition for the immediate realisation to be profitable. The risk-adjusted present value has to be larger than the option value of deferring the decision on realisation, which is foregone by immediate realisation. Hence, the option value will be an opportunity cost for the decision on immediate realisation.
Summing up, there are three sources of uncertainty in an investment analysis. One is the uncertainty about future project surpluses. Another is uncertainty about the investment cost, and a third is uncertainty about the opportunity cost of capital that is being locked up in the investment.
Uncertainty about future project surpluses. Assume that either a given project can be implemented immediately or the decision can be postponed for one year. Let A 0 denote realising the project immediately and A 1 in one year. The investment costs are NOK 540 mill. The annual net surpluses depend on the realisation of two possible, mutually exclusive random outcomes. One outcome gives an infinite stream of annual net cash flows of NOK 45 mill and the other infinite annual cash flows of NOK 15 mill. The two outcomes are equally probable and the discount rate (hurdle rate of return) is 5%. The decision maker is maximising net expected present value. We let E[N(A i )] denote expected net present value of project A i , i = 0, The reason for this is that by postponing the decision, one is preventing the outcome entailing a loss since the uncertainty is resolved after one period. The difference between the present value of waiting and that of deciding at once is the option value of maintaining the decision flexibility until the true state is disclosed. In this example the option value is NOK 111 mill. If the option value is treated as an opportunity cost for the decision on immediate realisation, this alternative is clearly not profitable. We may also note that realising the project immediately is the best decision if the choice is between now or never, as the project seen from today yields an expected rate of return that is larger than the required rate. However, if the alternative is to wait for another year before deciding, realisation today is not the optimal one.
It is, however, conceivable that postponing the realisation of the project for one year may lead to higher investment costs. One might then examine the maximal increase in the investment cost without violating the profitability of the wait-and-see alternative. which yields I Max = NOK 786 mill. That means that as long as the increase in the investment costs is less than 246 mill, the additional cost may be seen as a profitable investment in decision flexibility as given by the choice of implementing now or in one year. Similarly, a stepwise implementation of the project instead of implementing the project in full scale may be possible. This would also give an option value as the capacity can be adjusted to new information about the need and demand for the services of the project. One could then calculate how large an increase in cost that is tolerable with stepwise implementation without making implementation in full scale at once the most preferred alternative.
The concept of real option value in concept assessment is explored further in Sunnevågs' chapter, "The Impact of New Information", in which closer attention is paid to the latter topics.
Uncertainty about the investment cost. Uncertainty about investment cost is common to capital intensive projects with a long construction period. This is often the case within the energy sector, with large hydro-electric projects, and for power plants fuelled by natural gas, where the investment requirements associated with developing new technologies for handling CO2 are uncertain. The above example examines this problem, and is modified by assuming that future project surpluses are certain and equal to NOK 8 8 1 norwegian krone = 1 NOK 45 mill. per year, the cost of investing the first year is known with certainty, while investment cost the following year is uncertain. Assuming that immediate implementation requires an investment of NOK 800 mill, this yields a present value of NOK 100 mill. In one year the investments cost is assumed to be NOK 1200 mill with probability equal to 0.5, and NOK 400 mill with probability 0.5, which means an expected investment cost of 800 mill. This is the same as in the alternative, of immediate implementation. The project should only be realized if the favourable outcome occurs. Expected present value will then be 0.5 ⋅ NOK 500 mill, and discounting the expected value yields 250 / 1.05 = NOK 238 mill, so that the wait-and-see alternative is clearly better than realising the project immediately.
Uncertainty about the required rate of return (the discount rate). As a last example, it is assumed that investment costs and future project surpluses are known with certainty, while the future discount rate varies in an unpredictable way. The discount rate uncertainty will have two effects. Firstly, it will have a favourable effect on the present value. To illustrate this, it can be assumed that the time horizon of the project is infinite, and that the uncertain discount rate can take two values: 5% or 15% with equal probabilities. The expected discount rate will then be 10%. Assuming that the project yields a net surplus of 1 norwegian krone per period for the infinite future, the present value of the future income series evaluated at the discount rate of 10 % is 10 NOK. However, the expected present value when the discount rate might be either 5 % or 15%, with equal probabilities, is given by 0.5⋅1/0.05 + 0.5⋅1/0.15 = 13.33 > 10. Hence, an uncertain discount rate renders the project more attractive if maximum expected present value is the investment criterion 9 Secondly, even though the discount rate uncertainty is favourable for the expected present value, it might still be profitable to postpone the decision to implement the project until this uncertainty is resolved. This is due to the fact that the wait-and-see option enables the decision-maker to avoid the loss outcome given by a high realised value of the discount rate. Hence, the uncertainty about the discount rate will have the same effect on the decision to postpone as uncertainty about future project surpluses. This is shown by modifying the example above. It is now assumed that the project surpluses are known and equal to NOK 45 mill per year and that the investment cost is NOK 540 mill. The project will be in operation one year after the investment decision, and the discount rate will be 5% or 15% with equal probabilities. The project values are then 45/0.05 = 900 and 45/0.15 = 300 with equal odds. Hence, the expected net present value of the project is NOK 600mill -NOK 540 mill = NOK 60 mill so that the project is profitable according to the expected present value criterion. If the discount rate had been equal to its expected value with certainty, the net present value would have been 450-540 = -NOK 90 mill. and hence the project would have been unprofitable. If the decision to invest is postponed by one year, i.e. until the discount rate is known, the project would not be undertaken if the discount rate turns out to be 15%. If the investment decision is postponed, the expected present value will be . which is considerably larger than the expected value of taking the decision immediately at the beginning of the project.
To sum up, increased variability in the discount rate so that the expected rate remains unchanged ("mean preserving spread") will increase the present value of the project.Furthermore, it will be more profitable to postpone the decision as to whether or not to invest in the project. The reason for this is that the alternative of waiting enables the decisionmaker to avoid loss states with high future rate of return requirements; the probability of ending up in loss states increases with the variability of the discount rate.
Concluding remarks
Social profitability analysis of projects in a market economy will be based on market prices, to the extent that these are readily available. If the market system is complete and wellfunctioning, this will also be conducive to a socially optimal choice of projects. However, in such an ideal economy there is less need for social re-examination of private profitability calculations, as these two profitability concepts coincide. Hence, the raison d'être for a separate social cost benefit analysis to examine the social profitability of projects is that markets are lacking, or market prices are distorted, so that they do not reflect true social values and costs. The first part of this chapter discussed how to assess social values and costs without the support of market prices, and how to correct prices when they are misleading because of external effects or distortions.
The second part discussed the problems raised by incomplete information for the choice of project concept. If project investments are irreversible, and the expediency of a given project depends on uncertain factors, where the uncertainty is likely to be resolved at a later date, this might call for keeping the option open as to the choice of concept, by postponing the decision until the relevant information is revealed. Thus the project analysis would take place in two stages. In the first stage the project concept is chosen, and in the second stage the profitability of the chosen project is calculated. In practice the decisions at these two stages will be connected. In two-stage planning one usually starts with the last stage, which in the present case means calculating the profitability of the various project concepts under proposal. Going back to the first stage, one then chooses the project concept and the timing of its realisation, by comparing net social project values with their time-dependent option values.
